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Income-tax Department
Edited

by Stephen G.

Rusk

Decisions of the supreme court of the United States carry weight as the final
fiat as to the law of our country, and they are of importance to those interested
in the subject matter upon which the decision is based. On June 4th that court
rendered a decision of far-reaching importance on the subject of the jurisdiction
of courts to review the commissioner’s determinations under the relief sections
of the several excess and war-profits taxing acts.
Briefly stated, the supreme court concludes that congress confided to the
commissioner power of discretion to determine whether conditions surrounding
a taxpayer’s taxable income caused an imposition on him of an excess or war
profit tax out of proportion to that imposed on corporations engaged in a like or
similar business, and that this power is not subject to review by the courts.
The court distinguishes its decision in this case from that of the case of Blair
v. Oesterlein Machine Company, by directing attention to the fact that in the
latter case it decided only that the board of tax appeals was empowered to
review the commissioner’s decisions and had the right to the sources of informa
tion (statistics, tax returns, etc.), upon which the commissioner based his
determination. It points out that the law creating the board and defining its
powers intended that the board was to “perform the administrative functions
theretofore performed by the committee on appeals and review,” which had
formerly been established by the commissioner and had functioned as a part of
his administrative organization.
The much discussed revaluation as at March 1, 1913, by Commissioner Blair
of Ford Company stock sold in 1919 by a group of stockholders, was not upheld
by the United States circuit court, in the case of Fred R. Woodworth, collector,
v. Alice G. Kales.
The court held that:
“A commissioner may not, in the absence of fraud or mistake, clerical
or otherwise, in any fundamental fact or matter of law, reopen and re
determine, upon re-examination of the same evidence, the question of
March 1, 1913, value of stock . . . as fixed by a predecessor commissioner
prior to the sale thereof at the request of the buyers of the stock for the
guidance of the sellers, and used by the taxpayer on her 1919 return, (which
value) was accepted and used by his immediate successor ... in the
assessment of the tax for such year, and was later approved and confirmed
by subsequent successors in office including the commissioner who there
after determined the value of the stock.”

It is apparent that the fact that the present commissioner approved and con
firmed the value placed on the stock by his predecessor was of considerable
weight and proved a handicap to him in this litigation. It is not apparent that
the decision in this case will be a bar to a commissioner’s reviewing and re
assessing taxes that were examined and assessed by his predecessors.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Amount paid in income bonds may not be included in invested capital for
1917 to 1921, inclusive, where issued in payment of the goodwill of a corpora
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tion (the charter of which had expired) by a corporation which acquired the net
assets other than goodwill in exchange for its stock, and the bonds were to be
redeemed on or before a specified date from the net earnings of the corporation.
(U. S. circuit court of appeals, second circuit, The Baker and Taylor Company v.
United States.)
Amounts received in 1919, 1920 and 1921 in payment of non-interest bearing
notes maturing annually over a period of years, received in a sale of mineral
property in January, 1913, secured by a mortgage on the property, are taxable
on the excess of the amount received over the March 1, 1913, value of the notes.
(U. S. circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit, Ruth Iron Co. v. Commissioner.)
Profit from the sale of real estate is taxable in 1920 to a decedent on the cash
receipts and disbursements basis where, pursuant to a written contract of sale
entered into in 1919, 2½% of purchase price was paid in 1919 and the balance
was paid in 1920 in cash and purchase mortgage. (U. S. district court, Mary
land, Gideon Stieff, et al., executors, v. Galen L. Tait, collector.)
The expiration of the statutory period for collection of a tax is not a defense
in a suit brought after the expiration of such period on a bond given before the
statute had run by a taxpayer and a surety in connection with the filing of a
claim for abatement of such tax. (U. S. district court, E. D. Pennsylvania,
McCaughn, collector, v. Philadelphia Barge Co. and National Surety Co.)
Loss sustained on funding notes, secured in part by the pledge of assets and
in part by a second lien on such assets, received prior to March 1, 1913, by a
stockholder for advances made to the corporation, charged off as a bad debt in
1920 when the securities were finally liquidated, is deductible, under sec. 202
(a) (1), act of 1918, in the difference between the March 1, 1913, value and the
amount realized thereon in 1920 on the liquidation. (Court of appeals of D. C.,
Charles F. Ayer v. Commissioner.)
Accumulated dividends and undrawn salaries credited to certain stockholders
on the books of a corporation, not represented by notes, and upon which no
interest was paid, but left in the business pursuant to an agreement among such
stockholders at the time of the incorporation, should be included in invested
capital for 1919, 1920 and 1921, such amounts not constituting borrowed capi
tal. (Court of appeals of D. C., George Feick & Sons Co. v. Commissioner.)
The court will consider the evidence as adduced in a hearing before the board
of tax appeals, to the extent of determining whether or not the law, when ap
plied to the facts, establishes a cause of action. (Court of appeals of D. C.,
George Feick & Sons Co. v. Commissioner.)
Taxable gain from the dissolution of a corporation was realized in 1920,
where a decree of dissolution was obtained on December 30, 1919, and on
January 2, 1920, the assets were sold to the chief stockholders who agreed to
assume the liabilities of the dissolved corporation and to pay the purchase price.
(Court of appeals of D. C., Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., et al. v.
Commissioner.)
A commissioner may not, in the absence of fraud or mistake, clerical or other
wise, in any fundamental fact or matter of law, reopen and redetermine, upon
re-examination of the same evidence, the question of March 1, 1913, value of
stock—the statutory basis for computing gain upon the sale thereof—where
such value, as fixed by a predecessor commissioner prior to the sale thereof at
the request of the buyers of the stock for the guidance of the sellers, and used by
the taxpayer on her 1919 return, was accepted and used by his immediate suc
cessor in office of such predecessor commissioner, in the assessment of the tax
for such year, and was later approved and confirmed by subsequent successors
in office, including the commissioner who thereafter redetermined the value of
the stock. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit, Fred L. Woodworth,
collector, v. Alice G. Kales.)
Goodwill is not property used in trade or business within the meaning of sec
tion 214 (a) (8), act of 1918, nor subject to exhaustion, wear and tear. (U. S.
circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, Henry M. Landsberger v. John P. Mc
Laughlin, collector.)
The power to permit amendment to file consolidated returns for 1922, where
corporation claims to be affiliated for such year and filed separate returns, is
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discretionary with the commissioner. (U. S. district court, N. D., California,
S. D., Alameda Investment Co. v. John P. McLaughlin, collector.)
Inventories may not be valued at market regardless of cost, under sec. 203,
act of 1918. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit, J. A. Kemp, et al. v.
United States.)
Capital was held not to be a material income-producing factor where invested
in a building used by a corporation conducting a school of physical education
for gymnasium, offices, school rooms and for other school purposes, which
yielded no income apart from the services rendered, rent received for a portion
of the building being incidental rather than material. Such corporation was
held to be entitled to classification as a personal-service corporation for 1919,
1920 and 1921. (U. S. district court, Massachusetts, Posse-Nissen School of
Physical Education, Inc. v. United States.)
A trustee in bankruptcy, operating in 1917, under order of a bankruptcy
court, the business of a bankrupt domestic corporation and realizing net profits
from such operation, is not subject to the excess-profits tax imposed by the act
of 1917, in a case where, under the act, the corporation would have been sub
ject to such tax if it had been conducting the business itself. (U. S. supreme
court, Mabel G. Reinecke, collector, v. Frank G. Gardner, trustee in bankruptcy of
the O’Gara Coal Co.)
The supreme court did not answer a question certified to it as to whether in
terest accrued and payable in 1916 and paid in 1917 may be deducted in com
puting the net income of a trustee in bankruptcy operating the business of a
bankrupt corporation under order of a bankruptcy court, where the certificate
failed to state whether (1) the books of the trustee as kept reflected his income
or (2) his return was made on the accrual or the cash-receipts-and-disburse
ments basis. (U. S. supreme court, Mabel G. Reinecke, collector, v. Frank G.
Gardner, trustee in bankruptcy of the O’Gara Coal Co.)
Dividends declared by a corporation in 1919 and 1920 which were impounded
in the corporation treasury by court order pending suits brought by the alien
property custodian, were held to be income accumulated “for the benefit of un
ascertained persons” upon which it was the duty of the corporation as “fidu
ciary” to pay the tax. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, third circuit, Frank
Ferguson, collector, v. Adolfine Forstman et al.)
Cost of property acquired for stock was fixed at the price disclosed by the
deed and inventory attached thereto, rejecting the value entered on the books
in the amount of the par value of the stock issued therefor. (U. S. district
court, N. D. Louisiana, Shreveport, United States v. Robert L. Crook et al.)
The payment without formal protest prior to the enactment of the 1924 act,
of taxes assessed under sec. 900, acts of 1918 and 1921, was held to be under
sufficient protest and duress where, upon objection by the president of the
corporation at time of assessment and payment that the taxes were illegally and
erroneously demanded, the deputy collector replied that failure to pay would
expose the officers of the corporation to arrest and criminal prosecution. Even
if such protest were not sufficient, the taxpayer was held, nevertheless, to be
within the protection of Revised Statutes sec. 3226 as amended by act of 1924,
which provided that suit for recovery of a tax erroneously collected may be
maintained whether or not paid under protest or duress. (U. S. district court,
S. D., Ohio, N. D., Murray C. Weir, receiver, v. Stephen McGrath, collector.)
Action for refund of income tax paid should be brought by him who actually
paid the tax and not by him or them who might in equity or as a cestui que
trust, have some latent interest in the money in dispute. (U. S. district court,
E. J. D. Missouri, E. Div., Carleton Dry Goods Co. et al. v. United States.)
The taxpayer’s contention that stock was overvalued for gift-tax purposes
was rejected where stock in corporation organized to hold, manage and own
property derived from an estate by the taxpayer and her son was given to the
son by the taxpayer prior to the distribution of the undistributed portion of the
estate to the heirs who thereupon transferred it to the corporation, and the
value of such undistributed portion was included in determining the value of
the gift, the parol assignment of the undistributed portion to the corporation
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being valid and effective as between the parties. (U. S. district court, Cali
fornia, Ames L. Whitell v. McLaughlin, collector.)
A waiver executed prior to the enactment of the 1924 act, consenting to the
“determination, assessment and collection” of 1918 taxes effective for a period
of one year after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation, does not
prevent the application of the provisions of the 1924 act as to the statutory
period upon collection of the tax, where the tax, assessed after the passage of
the 1924 act, was assessed within the period as extended, the action of the tax
officers, if barred on the expiration of consent, being barred by virtue of the law
and not by force of the contract waiver. (U. S. district court, N. D., Georgia,
Bank of Commerce v. Josiah T. Rose, collector.)
The provision of sec. 301 (b), act of 1924, allowing a maximum of credit
against the tax imposed by sec. 301 (a), act of 1924 (as amended by sec. 322, act
of 1926), for estate, inheritance, legacy or succession taxes actually paid to any
state, etc., of 25% of the federal estate tax imposed by such act, held constitu
tional on the authority of the New York Trust Company v. Eisner, (256 U. S.
345), and Florida v. Mellon, (273 U. S. 12). (U. S. court of claims, John G.
Rouse, executor, v. United States.)
The determination whether a taxpayer is entitled to special assessment under
sections 326 and 327, act of 1918, confided by congress to the commissioner,
can not under that act be challenged in the courts—at least in the absence of
fraud or other irregularity—nor is jurisdiction to review the commissioner’s
determination conferred on the courts as a result of the act of 1924, which cre
ated the board of tax appeals. (U. S. supreme court, The Williamsport Wire
Rope Co. v. United States.)
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